Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 38
Issue 4 October 2005

Article 10

2005

A Choice-of-Law Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen Cultural
Property
Symeon C. Symeonides

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-of-Law Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen Cultural Property, 38
Vanderbilt Law Review 1177 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol38/iss4/10

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

A Choice-of-Law

Rule for Conflicts

Involving Stolen Cultural Property
Symeon C. Symeonides*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.

II.
III.

IV.

1178
TH E PROBLEM ................................................................
1.
The Problem and the Challenge.........................
1178
2.
A Typical Case: The Stolen Angels ....................
1178
3.
The Conflict of Laws ...........................................
1181
1181
The Court's Choice of Law ..................................
4.
5.
Right Result, Wrong Law ...................................
1182
THE PROPOSED RULE ..............................................
1183
1184
ANNOTATIONS TO THE RULE ..........................................
1.
The Rule's Residual Character..........................
1184
2.
S cope ....................................................................
1185
(a)
Corporeal Things ...................................
1185
1185
Things of Cultural Value ......................
(b)
3.
The Starting Point:The Lex Rei Sitae
1185
O riginis ................................................................
4.
Why Only a Presumption?................ . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . .
1186
5.
A Rule for True Conflicts....................................
1188
6.
The State of the "MateriallyCloser
Connection"............................ ............................
1189
7.
The Good FaithProviso...................
1190
8.
The Time Element: The Discovery Rule .............
1191
9.
The Discovery Rule and Evenhandedness.........
1192
10.
The Discovery Rule and the Forum's
1193
Statute of Lim itation..........................................
11.
The Discovery Rule and Nonforum
Substantive Law .................................................
1193
METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS .....................................

V.

Bridging the Common Law and Civil
Law Approaches..................................................
2.
Substantive Law Solutions to
Choice-of-Law Dilemmas ...................................
CONCLUSIONS ................................................................

1195

1.

1195
1196
1198

Dean & Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law; LL.B. (Priv. L.),
LL.B. (Publ. L.), Aristotelian University of Thessaloniki; LL.M., S.J.D., Harvard Law
School.

1177

1178

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38:1177

I. THE PROBLEM

1. The Problem and the Challenge
It has been said that trade in stolen art and antiquities is "the
second biggest international criminal activity after narcotics,"1 and it
is estimated to net from one to ten billion dollars annually. 2 Since
much of this trade occurs across state borders, it is relevant to the

law of conflict of laws. Conflicts scholars can neither prevent nor
reduce this illicit trade. Nevertheless, they can contribute by
assisting in the development of an international consensus about
which law should govern the rights and obligations of the disputants
once the stolen property surfaces. This Article is intended to
encourage and contribute to the development of such a consensus.
2. A Typical Case: The Stolen Angels
The impetus for this Article and the source of the Author's
interest in the subject is Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of
Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,3 a fairly typical 4 and

1.
Sydney M. Drum, Comment, DeWeerth v. Baldinger: Making New York a
Haven for Stolen Art?, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 909, 909 (1989).
2.
For other cases involving stolen artwork or antiquities, see Michele Kunitz,
Switzerland and the International Trade in Art and Antiquities, 21 NW. J. INT'L L. &
BUS. 519 n.2 (2001); Jonathan C. Moore, Enforcing Foreign Ownership Claims in the
Antiquities Market, 97 YALE L.J. 466, 468 n.12 (1988); Robin Morris Collin, The Law
and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 HOW. L.J. 17 (1993); James Nafziger,
InternationalPenal Aspects of Protecting Cultural Property, 19 INT'L LAW 835 (1985)
(providing various

estimates). But see JESSICA L. DARRABY,

ART, ARTIFACT, AND

ARCHITECTURE LAW § 6:117 (2004) ("Illicit art is big business and makes good press;
what the real numbers are in dollar terms is not known, and purported estimates are
simply speculations.").
3.
717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990). The
discussion hereinafter is confined to the district court decision. The Author served as
pro bono consultant to plaintiffs and their attorneys Thomas R. Kline and Thomas E.
Starnes. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the plaintiffs
or their attorneys. Nevertheless, because of the Author's involvement in this case and
the fact that he is a Cypriot, the Author claims no impartiality, either with regard to
the intrinsic merits of the plaintiffs' case or with regard to the fundamental right of
countries like Cyprus to protect their cultural heritage.
4.
See, e.g., Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002),
amended on denial of reh'g, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted in part, 539
U.S. 987 (2003), and aff'd on other grounds, 541 U.S. 677 (2004); Mucha v. King, 792
F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1986); Jeanneret v. Vichey, 693 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982);
Kunstsammlungen zu Weimar v. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 678
F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie's, Inc.,
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now well-known 5 case involving stolen antiquities. Autocephalous
1999 WL 673347 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 42 F. Supp. 2d
1029 (W.D. Wash. 1999), motion to dismiss granted, 70 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (W.D. Wash.
1999); Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 146 F.R.D. 24 (D. Mass. 1993); Republic of
Turkey v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Government
of Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 933 F.2d 1013 (9th Cir.
1991); Netherlands v. Woodner, No. 89 Civ. 7425 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); DeWeerth v.
Baldinger, 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 836 F.2d 103 (2d
Cir. 1987); Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Republic
of Lebanon v. Sotheby's, 561 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); Menzel v. List, 253
N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), on remand, 267 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1966), modified on
othergrounds, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y. 1967), modification rev'd, 246 N.E.2d 742 (1969)
(involving civil actions for the recovery of stolen art work or antiquities). See also, e.g.,
United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106
(2004); United States v. Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1136 (2000); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977),
reh'g denied, 551 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 593 F.2d 658 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 918 (1979); United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d
1154 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Swetnam, Indictment CR 88-914 RG (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 1988) (involving criminal prosecutions).
5.
For writings devoted exclusively to Autocephalous, see Pamela Farrell,
Foreign Relations-UnrecognizedForeign States-Title to Church Mosaics Unimpaired
by ConfiscatoryDecrees of Unrecognized State, Autocephalous Greek Orthodox Church
of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 790
(1992); Keith Highet et al., Cultural Property-Recoveryof Stolen Art Works-Choice of
Law-Recognition of Governments, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1992); Stephen L. Foutty,
Autocephalous Greeek Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc.: Entrenchment of the Due Diligence Requirement in Replevin Actions for Stone Art,
43 VAND. L. REV. 1839 (1990). See also Stephen A. Bibas, The Case Against Statutes of
Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437, 2447-49 (1994); Robin Morris Collin,
The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 HOw. L.J. 17, 18-19 (1993);
Claudia Fox, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects: An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in CulturalProperty, 9 AM. U.
J. INT'L L. & POLY 225, 242 (1993); Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two Innocents:
Creating an Equitable Balance Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith
Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 80 (1995); Joshua E. Kastenberg,
Assessing the Evolution and Available Actions for Recovery in Cultural Property Cases,
6 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 39, 52 (1995); Lawrence M. Kaye, Art Wars: The
RepatriationBattle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 79, 82 (1998); Lawrence Kaye, The
Future of the Past:Recovering Cultural Property, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 23, 30
(1996); Michael J. Kelly, Conflicting Trends in the FlourishingInternational Trade of
Art and Antiquities: Restituto in Integrum and Possessio animo Ferundi/Lucrandi,14
DICK. J. INT'L L. 31, 40 (1995); Jennifer N. Lehman, The Continued Struggle with Stolen
Cultural Property: The Hague Convention, The UNESCO Convention, and the
UNIDROIT Draft Convention, 14 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 527, 529 (1997); Paige L.
Margules, International Art Theft and the Illegal Import and Export of Cultural
Property: A Study of Relevant Values Legislation, and Solutions, 15 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 609, 637 (1992); Alexandre A. Montague, Recent Cases on the Recovery
of Stolen Art-The Tug of War Between Owners and Good Faith PurchasersContinues,
18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 75 (1993); William G. Pearlstein, Claims for the
Repatriationof Cultural Property:Prospects for a Managed Antiquities Market, 28 LAW
& POL' INT'L Bus. 123, 138 (1996); Thomas W. Pecoraro, Choice of Law in Litigation to
Recover National CulturalProperty: Efforts at Harmonization in Private International
Law, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 18-21 (1990); Linda F. Pinkerton, Due Diligence in Fine Art
Transactions,22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1990); Tarquin Preziosi, Applying a Strict
Discovery Rule to Art Stolen in the Past, 49 HASTINGS L. J. 225, 237-38 (1997); Robert
Schwartz, The Limits of the Law: A Call for a New Attitude Toward Artwork Stolen
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involved four sixth century mosaics depicting Jesus, the Virgin Mary,
an archangel, and two apostles. These mosaics were embedded in the
hallowed sanctuary of an early Christian church in the Republic of
Cyprus, in a region that has been occupied by Turkey since 1974. In

the late 1970s, Dikman, a Turkish national, illegally removed the
mosaics from the church and transported them through Turkey to
Germany, where he hid the mosaics for about a decade. In July 1988,
following a sale agreement negotiated through intermediaries in a
Dutch restaurant, Dikman transported the mosaics to the free-port
area of the Geneva airport, and delivered them to the buyer upon
receipt of $350,000 in dollar bills contained in paper bags. The
buyer-Ms. Goldberg, an Indiana art dealer-promptly shipped the
mosaics to Indiana and a few weeks later, offered to sell the mosaics
to the Getty Museum in California for approximately $20 million.
The museum's curator, who was familiar with these internationally
known mosaics, declined the offer and promptly notified the Republic
of Cyprus. The Republic and the Church of Cyprus offered to
reimburse Ms. Goldberg for the purchase price, in exchange for her
surrendering the mosaics. Following Goldberg's refusal, the Republic
and the Church filed suit in federal district court in Indiana in March
1989.

During World War II, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 5 (1998); Barbara J. Tyler, The
Stolen Museum: Have United States Art Museums Become Inadvertent Fences for Stolen
Art Works Looted by the Nazis in World War I?, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 441, 458-59 (1999);
Paul Tyler, A Defendant Who Intentionally Conceals His Identity May Be Equitably
Estopped From Asserting the Statute of Limitations When, as a Result of the
Concealment, the Plaintiff is Unable to Discover the Defendant's Actual Identity:
Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1772, 177475 (1995); Geri J. Yonover, The Golden Anniversary of the Choice of Law Revolution:
Indiana Fired the First Shot, 29 IND. L. REV. 1201, 1210 (1996); John E. Bernstein,
Note, The Protectionof Cultural Property and the Promotion of International Trade in
Art, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 125 (1992); Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The
Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
377, 400 (1995); Karen Theresa Burke, Note, InternationalTransfers of Stolen Cultural
Property:Should Thieves Continue to Benefit from Domestic Laws Favoring Bona Fide
Purchasers?, 13 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 427, 458 (1990); Judith Church, Note,
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Foreign Laws on National Ownership of Cultural
Property in U.S. Courts, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 179, 202 (1992); Stephanie 0.
Forbes, Comment, Securing the Future of Our Past: Current Efforts to Protect Cultural
Property, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 257-58 (1996); Stephen F. Grover, Note, The Need for
Civil-Law Nations to Adopt Discovery Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative
Study, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1431, 1449-50 (1992). Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen
Artwork: Deciding Ownership Is No Pretty Picture, 43 DUKE L.J. 337, 352 (1993);
Spencer A. Kinderman, Comment, The UNIDROIT Draft Convention on Cultural
Objects: An Examination of the Need for a Uniform Legal Framework for Controlling
the Illicit Movement of Culturalproperty, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 457, 482 (1993); Oliver
Metzger, Note, Making the Doctrineof Res Extra Commercium Visible in United States
Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 615, 636-37 (1996).
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3. The Conflict of Laws
As is typical in cases of transborder trade in stolen property,
Autocephalous implicated the laws of several jurisdictions: Cyprus,
Switzerland, and Indiana. 6 These laws differed in significant
respects.
Under the law of Cyprus, antiquities and things dedicated to
worship are designated as "out of commerce" and cannot be acquired
by a private person whether through sale, prescription, or otherwise.
Thus, if the Church of Cyprus could establish ownership under
Cypriot law, the Church could not lose that ownership under Cypriot
defendant invoked. The
law due to any facts or transactions the
7
Church was able to prove such ownership.
Under Swiss law, if read in the light most favorable to the
defendant, 8 the defendant could prevail if she purchased the mosaics
in good faith and the plaintiffs' action was filed more than five years
from the date of the theft.
Under Indiana law, a thief could not acquire, and thus could not
convey, ownership of the stolen property. The owner's action to
recover the property, however, must be filed within "six (6) years
after the action has accrued and not afterwards."9
4. The Court's Choice of Law
The court ultimately held that Indiana law should govern
because Indiana had the "most significant contacts" 1 or the "more
significant relationship."" Under Indiana law, the defendant could
not acquire ownership of the mosaics. The defendant argued,
however, that the plaintiffs' action to recover the mosaics was
untimely because it was filed more than six years from the time of
the theft, which occurred in the mid- to late 1970s. The court rejected
the defendant's argument, holding that the action did not "accrue,"
and therefore the statute of limitations did not commence until the

6.
A fourth jurisdiction, Germany, was also involved because Dikman kept the
mosaics there (albeit hidden) for about ten years before selling them to defendant. The
defendant, however, did not invoke German law because it did not vest Dikman with
ownership of the mosaics.
7.
See Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1397.
8.
But see Symeon C. Symeonides, On the Side of the Angels: Choice of Law
and Stolen Cultural Property, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA-LIBER

AMICORUM KURT SIEHR, 649, 758-60 (Jurgen Basedow et al. eds., 2000) (arguing that
Swiss law may not have been as favorable to the defendant as the court assumed).
Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1385.
9.
10.
Id. at 1394
11.
Id. at 1376, 1394.
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plaintiffs, using due diligence, knew or should have known the
12
identity of the possessor of the mosaics (the discovery rule).
After describing the plaintiffs' diligent but unsuccessful efforts to
locate the mosaics as soon as they learned of the theft, the court held
that the plaintiffs could not have discovered the identity of the
mosaics' possessor until Ms. Goldberg attempted to sell them to the
Getty Museum in late 1988.13 Moreover, the court held that even if
the statute of limitations commenced running at an earlier time, the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolled, or suspended, the running
of the statute for the ten year period when the mosaics were hidden
in Germany. 14 Finally, the court held in the alternative that even if
Swiss law applied, the defendant could not prevail because she
clearly did not purchase the mosaics in good faith. 15 Therefore, under
either Indiana or Swiss law, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the
mosaics, and the court so ordered.
5. Right Result, Wrong Law
In the Author's opinion, 16 the Autocephalous court clearly
reached the right substantive result. By ordering the defendant to
return the mosaics, the court reached the result dictated by the laws
of all three jurisdictions involved in the case. 17 However, from a
choice-of-law perspective, Autocephalous is problematic. As discussed
below, only one of these three jurisdictions-Cyprus-had a truly
legitimate claim to apply its law. Yet, the court applied the law of the
other two jurisdictions-Indiana, in the main, and Switzerland, in the
alternative. In this sense, the Autocephalous court reached the right
substantive result under the wrong law.
Although the erroneous choice of law was harmless in
Autocephalous, greater caution and analytical precision is necessary
in cases in which the laws of the implicated jurisdictions differ in
ways that would produce a different substantive result. For example,
when an owner of stolen property is protected by the law of the

12.
See id. at 1386-87, 1388-91.
13.
See id. at 1388-91.
14.
See id. at 1387-88, 1391-93.
15.
The court discussed pointedly and at length the suspicious circumstances
under which the defendant bought the mosaics. See id. at 1400-03. The court concluded
by quoting from the testimony of an expert witness: "The Court cannot improve on Dr.
Vikan's summation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding this sale: 'All the red
flags are up, all the red lights are on, all the sirens are blaring:"' Id. at 1402. The court
also found that the defendant failed to undertake even a minimally prudent inquiry
into the seller's title. See id. at 1403-04.
16.
A biased opinion (see supra note 3) need not be a wrong opinion.
17.
In this sense the Autocephalous case could be characterized as a sub-species
of a false conflict-the type in which the laws of the involved states are different in
content but in ways that, under the facts of the particular case, do not affect the
outcome.
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country in which the property was situated at the time of the theft,
but not by the law of the country or countries to which the property is
later removed, the resulting conflict is a veritable "true" conflict. This
conflict not only implicates the private interests of the parties
involved and the public interests of their respective home states, but
also implicates important societal and cultural values.18 The
following discussion focuses on this hypothetical pattern of cases and
proposes a succinct, elliptical, and neutral choice-of-law rule for
resolving the resulting conflicts.

II. THE PROPOSED RULE
1.

Except as otherwise provided by an applicable treaty or
international or interstate agreement, or statute, the rights of
parties with regard to a corporeal thing of significant cultural
value (hereinafter "thing")are determined as specified below.

2.

A person who is considered the owner of the thing under the
law of the state in which the thing was situated at the time of
its removal to another state shall be entitled to the protection of
the law of the former state (state of origin), except as specified
below.

3.

The owner's rights may not be subject to the less protective law
of a state other than the state of origin,
(a)

(b)

unless:
(i)

the other state has a materially closer connection to
the case than the state of origin;and

(ii)

application of that law is necessary in order to
protect a party who dealt with the thing in good
faith after its removal to that state; and

until the owner knew or should have known of facts that
would enable a diligent owner to take effective legal
action to protect those rights.

18.
Professor Erik Jayme identifies five interests implicated in conflicts
involving art works: (1) the interests of private parties, including the owner of the work
and of the artist who created it; (2) the interests of the involved states; (3) the interest
of the art market; (4) the global interest of the international civil society; and (5) the
interests of the artwork itself. See Erik Jayme, Globalization in Art Law: Clash of
Interests and InternationalTendencies, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 927, 929 (2005).
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ANNOTATIONS TO THE RULE

1. The Rule's Residual Character
As Paragraph I states, the proposed rule applies only to the
extent that it is not displaced by a hierarchically superior rule, such
as a rule contained in an applicable treaty or international or
interstate agreement. Examples of such treaties, in the United
States, are the UNESCO Convention of 197019 and certain bilateral
21
and UNIDROIT 22
treaties 20 and, in other countries, the Hague
conventions. Besides being hierarchically superior, such treaties or

See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit
19.
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823
U.N.T.S. 232. For discussion, see PREVENTING THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN CULTURAL
PROPERTY. A RESOURCE HANDBOOK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1970 UNESCO
CONVENTION (Pernille Askerud & Etienne Clement eds., 1997); PATRICK O'KEEFE,
COMMENTARY ON THE UNESCO 1970 CONVENTION ON ILLICIT TRAFFIC (2000); Maritza
F. Bolano, InternationalArt Theft Disputes: Harmonizing Common Law Principles with
Article 7(b) of the UNESCO Convention, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 129 (1992); Kevin F.
Jowers, Internationaland National Legal Efforts to Protect CulturalProperty: The 1970
UNESCO Convention, the United States, and Mexico, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 145 (2003);
Lyndel V. Prott, UNESCO and UNIDROIT a Partnership Against Trafficking in
Cultural Objects, in THE RECOVERY OF STOLEN ART 205 (Norman Palmer ed., 1998).
20.
The United States has bilateral agreements involving cultural property
with Bolivia, Cambodia, Canada, Cyprus, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy,
Mali, Nicaragua, and Peru. For citations, see 19 C.F.R. § 12.104(g) (2005). See also
Agreement for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and
Cultural Properties, U.S.-Ecuador, Jan. 14, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 875; Treaty for Recovery
and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, U.S.-Mex.,
July 17, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 494.
See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
21.
Armed Conflict and Regulations for the Execution of the Sard Convention, May 14,
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215. For discussion, see David A. Meyer, The 1954 Hague Cultural
Property Convention and its Emergence into Customary International Law, 11 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 349 (1993).
22.
See Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].
For discussion, see Brian Bengs, Dead on Arrival? A Comparison of the UNIDROIT
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects and U.S. Property Law, 6
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 503 (1996); James F. Fitzpatrick, Stealth
UNIDROIT Is USIA the Villain?, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 47 (1998); Claudia Fox,
The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects: An Answer
to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in CulturalProperty, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLY
225 (1993); John H. Merryman, The UNIDROIT Convention: Three Significant
Departures from the Urtext, 5 INT'L J. CULT. PROP. 11 (1996); Spencer A. Kinderman,
The UNIDROIT Draft Convention on Cultural Objects: An Examination of the Need for
a Uniform Legal Framework for Controllingthe Illicit Movement of Cultural Property,7
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 457 (1993); Marilyn E. Phelan, The UNIDROIT Convention on
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects Confirms a Separate Property Status for
Cultural Treasures,5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 31 (1998); Kurt Siehr, The Protection of
Cultural Property: The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention and the EEC Instruments of
1992/93 Compared, UNIFORM L. REV. 671 (1998).
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agreements provide more direct and efficacious ways of resolving or
preventing these conflicts. For different reasons, rules contained in
special statutes that directly regulate these matters would also
prevail over the proposed rule, which is intended as the residual rule
to guide the judicial choice of law.
2. Scope

(a)

Corporeal Things

The proposed rule speaks of a "corporeal" thing, which is the civil
law term for what the common law calls a "tangible" thing. Thus, the
rule does not apply to "incorporeal" or "intangible" things.
The rule uses the term "thing," rather than "movable" or
"immovable," because the rule is, in principle, intended to encompass
both categories. As a practical matter, the rule becomes operable only
when a thing is moved across state borders, and this can only occur if
the thing is movable. Before movement and theft, however, the thing
may well have been a part of another immovable thing, as was the
case with the mosaics in Autocephalous.
(b) Things of Cultural Value
The rule applies to things of "significant cultural value. '23 This
phrase includes, but is not limited to, things of archaeological value.
An interesting question for later exploration is whether the same rule
can work in cases involving stolen artworks that are not of high
cultural value but may be valuable in other respects. A further
question is whether the same rule could work well in cases involving
ordinary things-at least noncommercial things-that are not
covered by statutes or codes such as the Uniform Commercial Code.
3. The StartingPoint: The Lex Rei Sitae Originis
Although by definition the proposed rule deals with things that
are moved across state or national boundaries (conflit mobile), the

23.
For an expansive definition of things of "significant cultural value," see
Article 2 of the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, June 24, 1995, http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions.1995cultural
property/1995culturalproperty-e.htm [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention] ("[C]ultural
objects are those which, on religious or secular grounds, are of importance for
archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science and belong to one of the
categories listed in the Annex to this Convention."). For the meaning of the same term
under the Hague Convention, see R. O'Keefe, The Meaning of 'Cultural Property' under
the 1954 Hague Convention, 46 NETH. INTL L. REV. 26 (1999).
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choice of law analysis must begin from a single fixed point. The most
logical choice is the state in which the thing was situated at the time
of the critical event, typically the theft or other unauthorized
removal. For lack of a better term, this Article will refer to such place
as the "situs of origin." The starting premise of the proposed rule is
that a person who, under the law of the situs of origin, is considered
the owner of a thing, should not lose the protections and remedies
that law accords to owners just because the thing is now situated in
another state or country.2 4 For the same reasons that another's
unilateral act-such as a theft-should not alone negate those
protections, the unilateral removal of the thing to another state
should not negate them either. As the Second Restatement states,
"[i]nterests in a chattel are not affected by the mere removal of the
chattel to another state." 25 As in the Autocephalous case, the owner
may be justifiably unaware of the theft and the thief s identity, as
well as the removal of the thing to another state. Substantive law
protects the owners who are not blameworthy, and so should conflicts
law. Based on this rationale, Paragraph 2 of the proposed rule
enunciates a presumption in favor of the law of the situs of origin.
4. Why Only a Presumption?
Agreeing that the law of situs of origin should be the starting
point of any process of resolving any dispute involving conflicting
claims in the stolen thing leads to the next logical question: why
shouldn't that law also be the final point in the analysis? Indeed, no
lesser a body than the Institut de droit international advocated
precisely such a solution. During its 1991 session in Basel, the
Institut adopted a resolution calling for the unqualified application of
the law of the country whose cultural heritage embraces the
particular thing. The resolution provides that "[t]he transfer of
ownership of works of art belonging to the cultural heritage of the
'26
country of origin shall be governed by the law of that country.
Similarly, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, which provides
rules of substantive law rather than of choice of law, is based on the

This protection depends on whether that person is willing and able to prove
24.
ownership under that law. Failure to prove ownership would ordinarily defeat the
owner's action, even if the other party does not prove its own ownership. See
Government of Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989), affl'd, 933 F.2d 1013
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the government of Peru could not recover allegedly stolen
artifacts because the uncertainty of Peruvian domestic ownership laws precluded it
from proving ownership). This requirement is not anomalous because a party who is
not in possession does not benefit from the presumption of ownership that the other
party's possession entails.
25.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 247 (1971)

26.

Institute de droit international, Resolution of September 1999, 81 REV.

CRITIQUE DE DROIT INT'L PRIVP 203 (1992).
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premise that the law of the situs of origin is the controlling law. The
law of the situs of origin determines whether the cultural object has
been "stolen"27 or "illegally exported. '28 If so, then the Convention
of origin,
mandates the return of the object to the country of the situs
29
regardless of what the law of the current situs provides.
Both of the above proposals are commendable. Indeed, in an
ideal world, there should be no argument that the country of origin
has the closest connection and the most legitimate claim to apply its
own law in determining the ownership of objects comprising its
cultural heritage. However, the fact that only twenty-three countries
ratified or acceded to the UNIDROIT Convention-and none of them
are "market countries"13 0 (i.e., wealthy countries whose markets tend
to attract stolen antiquities)-serves as a reminder, if one were
needed, that we live in a world that is less than ideal. The typical
argument against applying the law of the situs of origin is that it
would deprive these countries of the ability to protect third parties
who, in good faith, acquire rights in the stolen property after its
removal to these countries.
If it is limited to third parties who have acted in good faith, this
argument has merit. Even so, this simply means that these other
states also have a certain interest in applying their own law-it does
not mean that this interest necessarily outweighs that of the situs of
origin. Which of the two interests should prevail in a given case is a
difficult question that admits different answers. The proposed rule
attempts to provide one such answer. It consists of a compromise that
retains the lex rei sitae originisbut reduces its role to that of a strong,
but rebuttable, presumption. The presumption is rebutted when the
owner's opponent satisfies all three conditions spelled out in
Paragraph 3 of the rule, as discussed below.

27.
See UNIDROIT Convention art. 3(2) ("[A] cultural object which has been
unlawfully excavated or lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained shall be considered
stolen, when consistent with the law of the State where the excavation took place.").
28.
See UNIDROIT Convention arts. 1(b), 5(2).
See UNIDROIT Convention, arts. 3(1), 5(1). The most recent conflicts law
29.
codification-that of Belgium-adopts a modified lex originis rule. Article 90 of the
Belgian Codification of Private International Law of July 27, 2004, provides that the
recovery of an object that has been removed illegally from the country in whose cultural
patrimony the thing belongs is governed by the law of that country. By way of
exception, however, this Article authorizes the application of the law of the current
situs in two circumstances: (1) at the choice of the claimant country; or (2) at the choice
of a good faith purchaser, in those cases in which the law of the situs of origin does not
protect good faith purchasers.
See Kurt G. Siehr, Globalization and National Culture: Recent Trends
30.
Towards a Liberal Exchange of Cultural Objects, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1067, 1073
(2005).
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5. A Rule for True Conflicts
Following the terminology first introduced by Professor Brainerd
Currie, modern American conflicts literature classifies conflicts cases
into three major categories: (1) false conflicts, (2) true conflicts, and
(3) no-interest or unprovided-for cases.3 1 The classification depends
on whether, in the particular case, (1) only one, (2) more than one, or
(3) none of the states involved in the case have an actual interest in
applying their respective laws. Because the existence of a state
interest is the statement of a conclusion about which reasonable
opinions can differ, this Author prefers a more objective terminology
that depends on which of the two parties would benefit from the
32
application of the laws of each involved state.
Applying this criterion to cases involving conflicting claims to
stolen cultural property produces three categories similar to those
described above, but with different names, to wit:
(1) Non-Conflicts: cases in which the law of both involved states (the state of
origin and the state to which the thing was removed) favor the same party,
either the owner or present possessor. Under the proposed rule, these cases
would be decided under the law of the situs of origin because there would be no
reason to attempt to rebut the presumption that the rule establishes in favor of
that law;
(2) Direct Conflicts: cases in which the law of the situs of origin favors the party
whom that law considers the owner ("owner"), whereas the law of the later
situs favors the other party, usually the present possessor of the thing ("nonowner"). The proposed rule deals directly with these cases, which are discussed
below; and
(3) Inverse Conflicts: namely cases in which the law of the situs of origin does
not favor the owner (and thus favors the non-owner), whereas the law of the
later situs favors the non-owner (and thus disfavors the owner). The phrase
"less protective," in Paragraph 3 of the rule, makes that paragraph literally
inapplicable to these cases because the law of the later situs is not 'less
protective" than the law of the situs of origin. Thus, literally speaking, cases
that qualify as inverse conflicts would continue being governed by the law of
the situs of origin under Paragraph 2 of the rule, even if that law is less
protective of the owner than the law of the later situs. The proposed rule,
however, purposefully does not mandate this result and thus allows the court
discretion, 3 3 in appropriate cases, to apply the law of the state with the

31.
See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of
Laws, 1959 DUKE L. J. 171 (1959); Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Choice-ofLaw Revolution in the Courts: Today and Tomorrow, 298 HAGUE ACADEMY RECUEIL
DES COURS 1, 43-47 (2003).
32.
For further discussion of these concepts and terminology, see Symeon C.
Symeonides, Choice of Law for Products Liability: The 1990s and Beyond, 78 TUL. L.
REV. 1247, 1258-60 (2004).
33.
In contrast to the pertinent Belgian rule (Belgian Codification, supra note
29), which leaves this choice to the claimant country, the proposed rule leaves the
choice to the court.
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materially closer connection, even when that law is more protective of the
34
owner than the law of the situs of origin.

The proposed rule deals expressly with direct conflicts only,
namely cases in which the law of the situs of origin favors the owner
of the thing while the law of the other involved state, usually the last
situs, favors the non-owner. The rule provides that these cases are
principally governed by the law of the situs of origin (Paragraph 2),
unless the owner's opponent demonstrates that the case satisfies all
the conditions prescribed in Paragraph 3.
6. The State of the "MateriallyCloser Connection"
Subparagraph (a) of Paragraph 3 of the rule articulates the first
condition for displacing the lex rei sitae originis. The displacement
can only be in favor of a state that has a "materially closer
connection" with the case than the state of origin. Other iterations of
this concept include a "manifestly more significant relationship," or a
"manifestly greater interest." The precise choice of words is less
significant than the basic notion that the threshold for rebutting the
presumption in favor of the lex rei originis should be very high
indeed. As the Autocephalous case demonstrates, 35 a relationship
such as the one claimed by the defendant with regard to Switzerland
does not even come close to this threshold and should not be
sufficient to displace the right of the situs of origin to apply its law. A
transitory, artificial relationship that is unilaterally fabricated by the
defendant (or by persons through whom the defendant claims) should
never be considered more significant than the relationship of the
situs of origin.
It is important, however, to stress that, under Paragraph 3(a),
even Indiana's relationship should not be considered more significant
than that of Cyprus, although it was clearly more significant than
that of Switzerland. The Autocephalous court correctly concluded
that, as between Indiana and Switzerland, Indiana had "the most
significant" relationship.36 However, to the extent that the use of the
superlative "most" may encompass a juxtaposition of more than two
comparables the quoted statement is less accurate.
Indeed, when one includes Cyprus in this comparison, it is
readily obvious that Indiana's relationship with the case was clearly
less significant than that of Cyprus. For example, there is no reason
to give more weight to the defendant's domicile in Indiana than to the

34.
Obviously, since these cases fall outside the literal scope of Paragraph 3,
the case need not satisfy the other conditions that paragraph prescribes for applying
that law.
35.
See Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1393-94 (describing Switzerland's "lack
of significant contacts").
36.
Id. at 1394 (emphasis added).
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plaintiffs' domicile in Cyprus. Unlike the plaintiffs, who had every
reason to rely on the protective law of their domicile and situs of
origin, the defendant could not claim any reliance on the nonprotective law of her domicile, especially since none of the acts
pertaining to the purchase took place in that state. Similarly there is
no reason to assign more significance to the situs of the mosaics at
the time of the trial than to their situs at the time of the theft,
particularly because the mosaics were not even movable before the
theft. The mosaics had been lawfully and publicly kept in Cyprus for
more than fourteen centuries and were unilaterally, secretly, and
recently brought to Indiana. Finally, the fact that Indiana was the
forum state does not, in and of itself, make Indiana's relationship any
more significant. The mere fact that litigation took place there may
justify the application of the forum's procedural laws, but rules
pertaining to the loss and acquisition of ownership of stolen property
should not be classified as procedural. 37 If the forum qua forum were
to automatically apply its statute of limitation, then states that have
short statutes of limitations would become safe havens for thieves of
cultural property or their transferees. The Autocephalous court
avoided that possibility, but only because it grafted a discovery rule
onto Indiana's statute of limitations.
7. The Good Faith Proviso
The second prong of Paragraph 3(a) further limits the
circumstances under which to apply the less protective law of the
state with the materially closer connection-i.e., only when necessary
to protect a party who dealt with the thing in good faith after its
removal to that state, such as a purchaser or creditor who acted in
good faith.3 8 In the Autocephalous case, Ms. Goldberg clearly did not
satisfy this proviso because the court found that she was not acting in
good faith when she bought the mosaics in Switzerland. Thus, even if
Switzerland had a materially closer connection (or, in the court's
terminology, a more significant relationship) than Cyprus, the court
should not apply Swiss law.
Likewise, even accepting the court's erroneous, but in this case,
harmless finding that Indiana had a more significant relationship

See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY C. PERDUE & ARTHUR VON MEHREN,
37.
CONFLICT OF LAWS, AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 384-90, 395-98 (2d ed.
2003).

The term "good faith" is a term of art, the precise meaning of which may
38.
differ slightly or more than slightly from state to state. Consequently, the proposed rule
should either provide a self-contained definition of good faith or designate the state
whose law would provide the definition. Since the proposed rule does not provide such a
definition, it leaves open the question of which state's law would provide the definition
in cases of conflict. The two candidates are (1) the law of the state in which the party
acted and (2) the law of the forum qua forum. The preferred solution is (1).
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than Cyprus, the fact that Ms. Goldberg did not act in good faith
would prevent her from taking advantage of Indiana law even if that
law was favorable to her. A different result would be possible, for
example, if the property had been situated in Indiana for a relatively
long time and third parties had dealt with the property in good faith
and in justifiable reliance on Indiana law. If the stolen mosaics had
been publicly exhibited for some time in the Indianapolis Museum of
Art and then sold at a public auction to a person who was acting in
good faith, then that person's reliance on Indiana law would deserve
appropriate consideration. For example, if under Indiana law that
person would be entitled to reimbursement of the purchase price from
the owner, such reimbursement should be due, even if it would not be
available under the law of the situs of origin, provided that the case
also satisfies the other conditions specified in Paragraph 3.
8. The Time Element: The Discovery Rule
Paragraph 3(b) of the proposed rule enunciates the third
condition for displacing the law of the situs of origin. This condition
39
parallels the discovery rule the court enunciated in Autocephalous,
except that the proposed rule has a broader scope. It not only
suspends the running of a statute of limitations as in the
Autocephalous case, but also suspends or delays the application of
any other law that would cause the loss of the owner's rights as a
result of the passage of time. This includes rules of acquisitive
prescription or adverse possession. The effect of the proposed
discovery rule is to suspend the running of time until the owner
knows or, in the exercise of due diligence, should have known of facts
that would allow the owner to take effective legal action to protect
the owner's rights.
While there is room for disagreement on the exact phrasing of
this rule, there should be little disagreement about the need for a
rule like this one. In today's extremely mobile market, the discovery
rule is a sensible, equitable, and indispensable vehicle for furnishing
diligent owners with a fighting chance to recover their stolen
property. Without such a rule, any pretense of protecting owners of

39.
For a statutory parallel, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 338(c) (West Supp.
1999) ("The cause of action in the case of theft . . . of any article of . . . artistic
significance is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the whereabouts of the
article by the aggrieved party"). For recent discussions of the discovery rule in the
context of similar cases, see Steven F. Grover, Note, The Need for Civil-Law Nations to
Adopt Discovery Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative Study, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1431 (1992); Tarquin Preziosi, Note, Applying a Strict Discovery Rule to Art Stolen in
the Past, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 225 (1997); Meghan A. Sherlock, Comment, A Combined
Discovery Rule and Demand and Refusal Rule for New York: The Need for Equitable
Consistency in International Cases of Recovery of Stolen Art and Cultural Property, 8
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 483 (2000).
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stolen property is truly a sham. For example, in Autocephalous, the
owner could not know of the exact time of the theft. Even when the
theft became known some years later, the owner could not ascertain
the thief's identity. Thus, the plaintiffs could not sue any person, in
any court, in any country. The application of the discovery rule would
be the only way to avoid a result that would prevent the thief from
benefiting from his own wrongdoing.
The proposed discovery rule would suspend the running of time
against the owner for as long as the owner, for reasons beyond the
owner's control, is unable to protect his or her ownership. The owner
should not lose the protection of the law of the situs of origin (even if
the law of a state with a materially closer connection denies that
protection), unless and until the owner has or should have had
knowledge of facts that would enable the owner to take effective legal
action to protect his or her ownership. As soon as that knowledge
becomes accessible, the clock starts running and the owner becomes
subject to the law of the state with the materially closer connection,
with all the attendant consequences. Depending on what that law
provides, these consequences may range from the complete loss of
ownership to anything short of that, such as recovery of the thing
upon reimbursing the possessor for the purchase price.
9. The Discovery Rule and Evenhandedness
As discussed in Part 111.8, the discovery rule has both a positive
and a negative effect on the owner. The positive effect is to prevent
the loss of the owner's rights before the owner is in a position to
protect them. This is in keeping with the ancient equitable maxim
contra non valentem agere non currit praescriptio (prescription does
not run against a person unable to act).
The negative effect is seen in the words "diligent owner" and
"should have known," which impose on the owner a duty of due
diligence and impute the owner with knowledge that a diligent owner
would have obtained. 40 As the Autocephalous case illustrates, in the
case of theft, this duty means, inter alia, that the owner must timely
report the theft to the proper authorities and launch a diligent search
to discover the whereabouts of the property and the identity of the
thief. In turn, the publicity caused by the owner's efforts would
reduce the chances that prudent, diligent people (i.e., people of good
faith) will buy the stolen thing. In turn, the discovery rule provides
an incentive to those who unknowingly buy a thing that turns out to

For a recent case in which this diligence was lacking, see Adler v. Taylor,
40.
No. CV 04-8472-RGK (FMOx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5862 at *12-*13 (C.D. Ca. Feb. 2,
2005) (involving a van Gogh painting that actress Elizabeth Taylor purchased at a
widely publicized Sotheby's auction in London).
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be stolen to publicize their possession of it so as to trigger the
running of time against the true owner. In summary, the discovery
rule is evenhanded to both parties and provides both parties with the
proper incentives to act prudently.
10. The Discovery Rule and the Forum's Statute of Limitation
A discovery rule is a rule of substantive law, not of conflicts law.
Indeed, when the Autocephalous court applied the discovery rule, it
did so because it concluded that the rule was part of Indiana's statute
of limitation. The defendants vehemently challenged that conclusion
on appeal, but the appellate court affirmed it. 4 l Thus the court was
able to avoid turning Indiana into a haven for possessors of stolen
property.
This risk, however, is real and is particularly high in those cases
in which: (a) the forum state follows the traditional common law
approach of applying the forum's shorter statute of limitation on the
theory that such statutes are always procedural 42 and (b) that statute
does not contain or is not accompanied by a discovery rule. This is
indeed a deadly combination. It means that the forum state can apply
its own statute of limitations without even examining whether that
state has any contacts that would make application of that law
reasonable, 4 3 or even constitutionally permissible, 44 and thereby
provides a safe harbor for virtually any thief who manages to bring
his loot to that state. A discovery rule that, as proposed here, is made
part of the applicable choice-of-law rule will avoid this phenomenon.
11. The Discovery Rule and Nonforum Substantive Law
As stated earlier, the discovery rule proposed here is meant to
apply not only when the forum applies its statute of limitations, as in
Autocephalous, but also when the forum applies its own or another
state's law of acquisitive prescription (adverse possession) or other
similar law.

41.
See Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 287-290 (7th Cir. 1990)
42.
See SYMEONIDES, PERDUE & VON MEHREN, supra note 37, at 384-87.
43.
See Patricia Y. Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigation
Between Original Owners and Good-faith Purchasersof Stolen Art, 50 DUKE L.J. 955,
1023 (2001) (cautioning that viewing the question as one involving conflicting
limitations periods leads to a "misstep that most seriously undermines the policies at
stake, because it permits the forum . . . to apply its own rule despite limited and
insignificant connections of the forum with the parties and the art.").
44.
See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding that the forum
state may constitutionally apply its own statute of limitations even if that state lacks
the contacts that would allow it to constitutionally apply its substantive laws to the
merits).
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The Autocephalous court's decision to apply Swiss law in the
alternative is an example on point. As noted earlier, Swiss law
arguably provides that if Ms. Goldberg was in good faith when she
bought the mosaics, she would have prevailed because, although her
purchase from a non-owner did not vest her with ownership, the
owner's action to recover the mosaics was not filed within five years
from the theft. In another publication, this Author has argued that
Swiss law is neither as unreasonable nor as unfair to the owner as
the above description suggests and that Ms. Goldberg could not have
prevailed, even if she had acted in good faith. 45 This is so because (1)
to the extent that the pertinent rules of Swiss law are rules of
acquisitive prescription, Goldberg did not meet their requirements
because she did not possess the mosaics openly and publicly for five
years following her purchase and (2) in any event, Swiss law
recognizes a discovery-type rule.
In the actual case, both of these points became moot because the
court found that Ms. Goldberg was clearly not in good faith when she
took delivery of the mosaics at the Geneva airport. In other cases in
which the buyer is in good faith, however, the buyer qualifies as an
"innocent" party and comes within the class of people whom the legal
order is obligated to protect. The difficult question becomes how to
choose between an innocent buyer and an innocent owner from whom
46
the thing was stolen.
The discovery rule proposed here makes the choice dependent on
the owner's actual or imputed knowledge of the whereabouts of the
property. If, despite exercising due diligence, the owner could not
have known of the whereabouts of the property, including its
presence in Switzerland, the owner could not have taken any effective
legal action to protect his or her rights. In such a case, it is
appropriate to consider the owner as the "more innocent" of the two
parties and continue protecting the owner under the law of the situs
of origin, even if the second situs (Switzerland) were to have a

45.
See Symeon C. Symeonides, On the Side of the Angels: Choice of Law and
Stolen Cultural Property, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA: FROM
NATIONAL

CONFLICT

RULES TOWARDS

HARMONIZATION

AND UNIFICATION:

LIBER

AMICORUM KURT SIEHR, 649, 755-760 (Jurgen Basedow et al. eds., 2000).
46.
See Reyhan, supra note 43, at 961.
One central feature [that] characterizes disputes arising out of stolen art ... [is
that] [t]he disputes are between two relative innocents: the original owner from
whom the art was wrongfully taken or withheld and a person or entity who is,
or at least claims the status of, a good-faith purchaser. Such a juxtaposition is
one that renders it impossible for the law to mete out exact justice.
(Internal quotations omitted); Ashton Hawkins, Richard A. Rothman & David B.
Goldstein, A Tale of Two Innocents: Creatingan Equitable Balance Between the Rights
of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49
(1995); Michelle I. Turner, The Innocent Buyer of Art Looted During World War II, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1511 (1999).
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materially closer connection and the defendant had bought the
property in good faith. Conversely, if the owner knew or, in exercising
due diligence, should have known of the whereabouts of the property,
then the owner is no longer the more innocent party and does not
deserve the continuing protection of the law of the situs of origin.
This is precisely how the discovery rule proposed here is intended to
operate. In this hypothetical case, the rule would suspend the
running of time under Swiss law, regardless of whether that law was
one of acquisitive or liberative prescription, and regardless of
whether Swiss law itself contained a discovery rule of its own.

IV. METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS

1. Bridging the Common Law and Civil Law Approaches
Although various legal systems handle actions for the recovery of
stolen property through many different approaches, one can group
these approaches into two basic categories: (1) liberative prescription
(statute of limitations) and (2) acquisitive prescription (adverse
possession).
The first approach, which is followed in many common law
systems, such as the forum state of Indiana in Autocephalous, focuses
on the owner's inaction, rather than on the adverse possessor's
activity. If the owner fails to bring the necessary action against the
adverse possessor within the period specified in the statute of
limitations, then the owner's action is barred: (a) even if the
possessor has not met the requirements for acquiring ownership of
the property and (b) even if (in the absence of a discovery rule) the
owner did not have actual or imputed knowledge of the whereabouts
of the property.
The second approach, which is followed in many civil law
systems, focuses on the activities of the adverse possessor rather than
of the owner of the property. If the possessor possessed the property
openly and publicly for the requisite period (which is shorter if the
possessor acted in good faith), then the possessor acquires ownership,
even if the owner did not have actual or imputed knowledge of the
whereabouts of the property.
Contemporary realities, at least those involved in the crossborder trade of stolen cultural property, demonstrate the severe
inadequacies of both of these approaches. The liberative prescription
approach leads to a result that is both inequitable and conceptually
anomalous. This approach is inequitable because, in the absence of a
discovery rule, it bars the owner's action to reclaim the owner's
property without regard to whether the owner ever had the
knowledge necessary to assert it. It is conceptually anomalous in
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that, by barring the owner's action, this approach effectively negates
the plaintiffs ownership even when the defendant did not meet the
requirements for acquiring ownership.
The acquisitive prescription approach avoids the conceptual
anomaly, but it does not correct the unfairness resulting from the
failure to inquire as to whether the owner had the necessary
knowledge to protect his or her ownership. The original assumption,
which was plausible in the context of small rural societies from which
this approach originated, was that a diligent owner would easily
acquire such knowledge because the adverse possessor's possession
must have been open and public in order to be effective. Obviously,
this assumption is no longer reasonable in contemporary cases of
cross-border movement of stolen goods. With the speed of today's
transportation, a stolen thing may be moved thousands of miles away
in the course of a single day. Even if the thing is possessed "openly
and publicly" in the second situs, it may be extremely difficult for the
owner to discover such possession. As one author noted, "[u]nlike
domestic animals, to which much of the early adverse possession
cases apply, art is seldom open to view by the general public in the
'4 7
way that horses and cows are.
The discovery rule would cure the inadequacies of both of these
approaches by focusing on the owner and asking the right questions,
namely, whether the owner knew or should have known of facts that
would enable the owner to take effective legal action against the
possessor of the thing. 48 If this is not the case, then the owner's rights
should remain subject to the law of the situs of origin. If such is the
case, then the owner's rights should be subject to the law of the state
that has the "materially closer connection."
2. Substantive Law Solutions to Choice-of-Law Dilemmas
As noted earlier, the proposed rule deals with true or direct
conflicts, namely cases that by definition present the most intractable
of conflicts because each of the involved states has a legitimate claim
to apply its own law. The state of the situs of origin has every reason
to apply its law to protect the owner, who is likely to be one of its
domiciliaries and who would ordinarily have no reason to anticipate
the application of another state's law. Likewise, the state of the last

47.
Preziosi, supra note 39, at 234; see also Steven A. Bibas, The Case Against
Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE L.J. 2437, 2442 (1994) (noting that law
developed for "horses, cattle, sheep, and mules" does not work well when used to cover
more easily concealed objects).
48.
See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 872 (N.J. 1980) ("[t]he discovery rule
shifts the emphasis from the conduct of the possessor to the conduct of the owner" by
asking "whether the owner has acted with due diligence in pursuing his or her personal
property.").
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situs has every reason to want to apply its law to protect third parties
who may have acted within its territory in reliance upon that law.
Good arguments can be made for applying the law of either state.
In making a choice between the two laws, the proposed rule
relies on three tests or factors. The first test is "conflictual" while the
remaining two are substantive. 49 The conflictual test is the classic
method of weighing the geographical, personal, and other factual
contacts of the case and the parties with the involved states in order
to determine whether a state other than the state of the situs of
origin has a materially closer connection.
The substantive tests consist of two additional inquiries directed,
respectively, at the two disputing parties and those deriving rights
through them. The first inquiry focuses on the buyer or other third
party and seeks to ascertain whether they acted in good faith at the
critical time. The second inquiry focuses on the owner and seeks to
determine whether the owner knew or should have known of the
whereabouts of the property and, if not, whether the owner exercised
due diligence.
Obviously, these tests embody certain value judgments or
considerations of substantive justice. The first is that only good faith
purchasers and diligent owners deserve the protection of conflicts
law. The second is that when both parties pass the test (such as when
the buyer acted in good faith and the owner could not have known of
the whereabouts of the property despite his due diligence) the
proposed rule opts in favor of protecting the owner.
While there is no need to apologize for these value-laden choices,
it is worth noting their methodological implications. Because of these
choices, the proposed rule is neither a pure choice-of-law rule nor a
pure substantive rule, but rather a blend or hybrid between the twoit is une r~gle de conflit e coloration matgrielle.50 As discussed in
detail elsewhere, 5 1 this combination of substantive and conflictual
elements is not only permissible, but also beneficial when used
carefully.

For the difference between "conflictual" and substantive or "substantivist"
49.
methods and techniques, see Symeon C. Symeonides, American Choice of Law at the
Dawn of the 21st Century, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 4, 11-16 (2001).
For elaboration of this concept, see Symeon C. Symeonides, MaterialJustice
50.
and Conflicts Justice in Choice of Law, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE
THIRD MILLENNIUM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER 125 (Patrick J.
Borchers & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2001). For comparative discussion, see SYMEON C.
SYMEONIDES, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY:
PROGRESS OR REGRESS? 43-62 (1999).

See Symeonides, supra note 49, at 46-69 (discussing the challenge of
51.
combining jurisdiction-selecting rules with content- and result-oriented rules).
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V. CONCLUSIONS

Combating illicit trade in stolen cultural property is and will
continue to be a serious problem. Of all the measures that various
states can take in combating this trade, the adoption of a choice-oflaw rule would rank very low in importance and effectiveness. Even if
one thinks only in terms of legal rules, there is little question that
international conventions and agreements, criminal and other publiclaw statutes, and uniform substantive rules would be far more direct
and effective than choice-of-law rules. At the same time, these other
rules are much more difficult to adopt precisely because they
presuppose a degree of consensus that is difficult to attain.
In contrast, a consensus for a uniform choice-of-law rule is a far
less ambitious goal and thus easier to attain-or so one hopes. In
turn, this hope cannot be tested without putting forward specific
proposals or contributing to the relevant debate. This Article has
proposed a specific, if only modest, but hopefully balanced choice-oflaw rule. The rule may or may not be found acceptable, but if it helps
stimulate the debate-even by becoming a target of criticism-then
this Article will have served its purpose.

